Pećnjak, Davor (2010) Controlling the Control and Strong Agent-Causal Libertarianism. Prolegomena: časopis za filozofiju, 9 (2). pp. 287-293. ISSN 1333-4395
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Abstract
In this article I defend Strong Agent-Causal Libertarianism in O’Connor’s version against several objections raised by David Widerker. More specifically, I try to show that we can overcome difficulties raised by the question whether an agent has a control over controlling doing action E, by objection of possible nomically sufficient condition for obtaining of E and by objection of possible logically or metaphysically sufficient condition for obtaining of E.
| Item Type: | Article |
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| Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) |
| Depositing User: | Maja Šoštarić |
| Date Deposited: | 19 Sep 2014 13:24 |
| Last Modified: | 19 Sep 2014 13:24 |
| URI: | http://eprints.ifzg.hr/id/eprint/112 |
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