

ΟΜΟΣΕ ΧΩΡΕΙΝ: SIMPLICIUS, COROLLARIUM
DE LOCO 601.26–8 (DIELS)

Having completed his commentary on Aristotle's *Physics* 4.1–5, chapters dedicated to the subject of place, Simplicius embarks on a lengthy digression in which he raises a number of difficulties for Aristotle's account of place, inquires into the sources of these difficulties and considers alternative, mostly Neoplatonic, accounts of place. Since the critical edition by H. Diels, this digression has come to be known as 'Corollarium de loco' or *Corollary on Place*.¹

After a statement of the aim of the *Corollary* and an elaborate division of ancient views on the nature of place, Simplicius turns to Aristotle's views. He introduces Aristotle's theory with a somewhat obscure remark:

πρῶτον δὴ τούτοις ἐπιστήσοι ἂν τις, οἷς ὁμόσε κεχώρηκεν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης, τῷ τε μὴ κινεῖσθαι κατὰ τόπον τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τῷ μὴ εἶναι μήτε αὐτὸν μήτε τὸ πᾶν ἐν τόπῳ. (601.26–8)

One should first pay attention to two points that Aristotle ran together, that the heaven does not change its place and that neither it nor the universe is in a place.²

Urmson's translation strongly suggests that the passage depicts Aristotle as somehow conflating or confusing the two points, namely, (i) that the heaven does not change in respect of place and (ii) that neither the heaven nor the whole universe is in a place. Although Aristotle subscribed to these two theses, appropriately qualified,³ we have no reason whatsoever to think that he himself confused or conflated them. Nor do we have any reason to think that Simplicius attributes such a confusion to Aristotle. In the sentences following the quoted passage, Simplicius proves that Aristotle indeed endorsed those two points, and then goes on to criticize

* This article is an outcome of the collaboration made possible by TOPOI – Cluster of Excellence 264, Berlin (<http://www.topoi.org>). We would like to thank István Bodnár, Klaus Corcilius, John Dillon, Guy Guldentops, and Pavlos Kalligas for their helpful comments on earlier versions.

¹ Simplicius, *In Aristotelis Physicorum libros quattuor priores commentaria*, (*Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca* IX), ed. H. Diels (Berlin, 1882), 601.1–645.19. Before Diels, this digression used to be referred to as *παρέκβασις* in one Greek manuscript or *digressio* in the first Latin translation: see E. Sonderegger, *Simplikios, Über die Zeit: ein Kommentar zum Corollarium de tempore* (Göttingen 1982), 22–6 and P. Golitsis, *Les commentaires de Simplicius et de Jean Philopon à la Physique d'Aristote* (Berlin and New York, 2008), 84, who follows Sonderegger.

² Simplicius, *Corollaries on Place and Time*, trans. J. O. Urmson (Ithaca, NY, 1992), 18.

³ Regarding point (i), Aristotle is committed to the view that the heaven as a whole does not change by leaving one place for another. However, this does not preclude it from undergoing circular motion: see *Ph.* 4.5, 212a31–b1, b11–14, and 6.9, 240a29–b7. Regarding point (ii), he is committed to the view that there is nothing outside of the heaven, so it cannot be in a place properly speaking. However, the heaven is in a place accidentally, insofar as each and every part of it is in a place: see *Ph.* 4.5, 212b7–11, b14–22. Simplicius concludes at 602.26–31 that both points follow from Aristotle's definition of place as the inner limit of the surrounding body.

Aristotle for doing so, without ever implying that Aristotle confused or conflated the two points.

Urmson's translation, we argue, is based on a false rendering of the phrase *ὄμοσε κεχώρηκεν*. There is no evidence that *ὄμοσε χωρεῖν* can mean something like 'to run together'. What LSJ indicates, rather, is that *ὄμοσε* in combination with verbs of motion forms an idiomatic expression with two meanings, one literal and one metaphorical.⁴ Other dictionaries that we have consulted list one or both meanings of the phrase that can be found in LSJ but nothing to support Urmson's translation.⁵

The literal meaning of the phrase is that of coming in a hostile manner to the same spot occupied by someone else, typically in order to oust or fight the other person. Thus LSJ (s.v. *ὄμοσε* 1) translates *ὄμοσε ἵεσθαι* as 'come to close quarters, close with the enemy', referring to Aristophanes *Eccl.* 863 (*ὄμοσ' εἶμι κύφας* [sc. *ταῖς κωλύσωσι*]) and Thucydides *Hist.* 2.62.3 (*ἵεσθαι δὲ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ὄμοσε*). In the same entry we find the phrase *ὄμοσε ταῖς λόγχαις ἵεσθαι* from Xenophon's *Symp.* 2.13, which Harpocration explains as 'to come from the opposite side to the same spot and neither turn away nor flee'.⁶

Similarly, *ὄμοσε χωρεῖν* is translated (s.v. *χωρέω* 2.1) as 'to join battle', with references to Thucydides *Hist.* 6.101.5 (*ὄμοσε χωροῦσι τοῖς τριακοσίοις τούτοις*) and Aristophanes *Lys.* 451 (*ὄμοσε χωρῶμεν αὐταῖς* [sc. *γυναιξίν*]).⁷ In Aristotle's *Hist. An.* 9.5, 594b11 the phrase is used not for people but animals, describing a situation in which a bear fights a bull (*ὄμοσε χωρήσασα* [viz. *ἡ ἄρκτος*] *τῷ ταύρω*). This meaning seems to be predominant; in fact, some lexicographers associate this meaning alone with the adverb *ὄμοσε*. Thus, in his *Lexicon Platonicum* (Ruhnken p. 160), Timaeus the Sophist gives the following explanation: *εἰς ταῦτὸ τῷ ἐναντίῳ εἰς μάχην φερόμενοι*.⁸

Presumably, the metaphorical meaning represents a natural extension from the physical to the intellectual realm. LSJ (s.v. *ὄμοσε* 2) translates *ὄμοσε ἵεσθαι τοῖς ἐρωτήμασι* from Plato's *Euthd.* 294D as 'come to issue with the questions'. This passage provides an illustration of both meanings. Two arrogant young soph-

⁴ LSJ (s.v. *ὄμοσε*) notes one exception to this rule, namely Demosthenes 56.14, where the phrase *ὄμοσε πορεύεσθαι* is said to mean 'to move towards an agreement'. On this passage see below p. 729.

⁵ We have consulted Stephanus' *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae* (Paris, 1831–65, 1st edn 1572); Passow's *Handwörterbuch der griechischen Sprache* (Leipzig, 1841–57, 1st edn 1819–23); Hederich's *Lexicon Graeco-Latinum* (Rome, 1832), Pape's *Griechisch-Deutsches Handwörterbuch* (Braunschweig, 1908, 1st edn 1842); Sophocles' *Greek Lexicon of the Roman and Byzantine Periods* (Cambridge, MA, 1914) and Lampe's *A Patristic Greek Lexicon* (Oxford, 1961).

⁶ λέγεται δὲ ἐκ μεταφορᾶς τοῦ ὄμοσε ταῖς λόγχαις ἵεσθαι ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐξ ἐναντίας εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ἔρχεσθαι καὶ μὴ στρέφεσθαι μηδὲ φεύγειν. W. Dindorf (ed.), *Lexicon in decem oratoreum Atticos* (Oxford, 1853), 223.1–2; see also Photius and *Suda* s.v. *ὄμοσε ἵεσθαι*.

⁷ The phrase is used in the same way elsewhere in Thucydides (e.g. *ὄμοσε χωρήσαι τοῖς ἐναντίοις*, 4.10.1), as well as in Xenophon (e.g. *ὄμοσε ἐχώρησαν τοῖς ἐπικειμένοις*, *HG* 6.5.14), Polybius (e.g., *ὄμοσε χωρεῖν εἰς τοὺς πολεμίους*, *Hist.* 15.10.7), Dionysius of Halicarnassus (e.g., *ὄμοσε τοῖς ἐχθροῖς χωρεῖν*, *Ant. Rom.* 2.43.4), Plutarch (e.g., *ὄμοσε χωρεῖν τοῖς βαρβάροις*, *Vit. Cim.* 13.1), etc.

⁸ For the necessary conjecture *τῷ ἐναντίῳ*, instead of the MSS. reading *ὑπὸ τῶν ἐναντίων*, see M. Bonelli, *Timée le Sophiste: lexique platonicien* (Leiden and Boston, MA, 2007), 480–2. Similarly, the scholiast to Homer's *Iliad* (ad 13.337) writes: *τὸ δὲ ὄμοσε οἱ Ἀττικοὶ ἐπὶ πολεμικῆς παρασκευῆς φασιν* (H. Erbse (ed.), *Scholia graeca in Homeri Iliadem (scholia vetera)*, vol. 3 (Berlin, 1974)); cf. Photius and *Suda* (s.v. *ὄμοσε*): *ὄμοσ' εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον, ἢ ἐξ ἐναντίας, σφοδρῶς, θρασέως*.

ists, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, are said to face Ctesippus' questions boldly, 'like boars charging against the blow'.⁹ The other two references in LSJ for the metaphorical meaning are Plato *Resp.* 610C (ὁμόσε τῷ λόγῳ τολμᾷ ἰέναι) and Euripides *Or.* 921 (χωρεῖν ὁμόσε τοῖς λόγοις θέλων). In these passages from Plato and Euripides the phrase consisting of ὁμόσε and a verb of motion is used to express the idea of coming to grips with an argument that one opposes in order to refute it.¹⁰

This survey shows that, as LSJ and other dictionaries suggest, the phrase ὁμόσε χωρεῖν has two meanings: the literal meaning ('to come to close quarters', typically with a hostile person or animal) and the metaphorical meaning ('to come to issue' or 'to come to grips', typically with an unpalatable statement or argument). The translation of the metaphorical meaning produced by LSJ (i.e. 'to come to issue'), however, is rather indeterminate as to whether the phrase carries any definite connotations. For one would naturally expect, if the metaphorical meaning is an extension of the literal meaning, that the person 'coming to issue with an argument' is opposed to the argument and tries to dismantle it. Indeed, this connotation is noticeable in the way that classical and Hellenistic authors commonly use the phrase ὁμόσε χωρεῖν with reference to a statement or an argument.¹¹ The adversative connotation of ὁμόσε in combination with a verb of motion is borne out nicely in the commentary on Homer's *Iliad* by the Byzantine scholar Eustathius (3.480.30–481.1 [van der Valk], ad *Il.* 13.337):

Observe also that the Attic writers, taking their start from the expression ὁμόσε ἦλθεν ἢ μάχῃ, use ὁμόσε in the context of war or other forms of opposition, saying 'so-and-so countered so-and-so' (ὁμόσε ἦλθεν ὁ δεῖνα τῷ δεῖνι), that is, he opposed him in order to fight against him, and 'he countered arguments or objections' (ὁμόσε ἦλθεν τοῖς λόγοις ἢ ταῖς ἀντιλογίαις).

The preceding discussion makes clear the problem of correctly understanding and translating the passage with which we began this article. Assuming that the phrase ὁμόσε χωρεῖν in Simplicius' *Corollary* 601.26 cannot have the literal meaning ('to join battle'), we are left with the metaphorical one. However, in the latter case Simplicius would essentially be saying that Aristotle grappled with, or rejected, those two points, namely (i) that the heaven does not change in respect of place and (ii) that neither the heaven nor the whole universe is in a place, whereas the context of the *Corollary* clearly requires Simplicius to be saying that Aristotle embraced or endorsed the two points. However, LSJ and other dictionaries provide no support for such a meaning of ὁμόσε χωρεῖν.

⁹ τῷ δὲ ἀνδρείοτατα ὁμόσε ἦτην τοῖς ἐρωτήμασιν, ὁμολογοῦντες εἰδέναι, ὥσπερ οἱ κάπροι οἱ πρὸς τὴν πληγὴν ὁμόσε ὠθούμενοι. Plato, *Euthydemus* 294D5–7; cf. Aristotle, *Eth. Eud.* 3.1, 1230a22–3: ἢ τῶν θηρίων [sc. ἀνδρεία], ἃ διὰ τὸν θυμὸν ὁμόσε τῇ πληγῇ φέρεται.

¹⁰ The same use of the phrase is found two more times in Plato, in *Euthrphr.* 3C (ἀλλ' οὐδὲν αὐτῶν χρὴ φροντίζειν, ἀλλ' ὁμόσε ἰέναι) and in *Tht.* 166A (ὁμόσε χωρήσεται καταφρονῶν ἡμῶν), and once in Aristotle (ὁμόσε βαδιέται τῷ Παρμενίδου λόγῳ, *Metaph.* 14.2, 1089a3; cf. Ps.-Alexander, *In Metaph.* ad loc. [805.15–17]).

¹¹ Dionysius of Halicarnassus (e.g. ὁμόσε χωρήσω τοῖς σοῖς λόγοις, *Ant. Rom.* 4.35.1), Plutarch (e.g. ὁμόσε χωρεῖν ταῖς κατηγορίαις, *De mul. vir.* 256B), Lucian (e.g., ὁμόσε χωρήσας τῷ ἐπιφερομένῳ ἐγκλήματι, *Apol.* 13) and Galen, who describes people who reject observed facts with the phrase ὁμόσε χωρεῖν τοῖς φαινομένοις (*Nat. Fac.* 39.13, 43.14; *Plac. Hipp. et Plat.* 3.7.16 [de Lacy]).

In the rest of the article we propose to solve this problem by demonstrating that the phrase *ὁμόσε χωρεῖν* can have what we would call a ‘concessive’ connotation, such that one’s coming to grips with a statement or argument eventually leads one to *accept* it.¹² This possibility has not been acknowledged by LSJ, other dictionaries or ancient lexicographers. More to the point, we found the metaphorical meaning of the phrase *ὁμόσε χωρεῖν* with a concessive connotation only in three Neoplatonic authors, and hence we are inclined to conclude that it represents a late usage of *ὁμόσε χωρεῖν*. Of course, this is not to say that the Neoplatonists were unacquainted with the more common metaphorical usage of the phrase; on the contrary, they use it quite frequently with an adversative connotation.¹³

Let us now consider those passages in which the phrase is used metaphorically but with a concessive connotation.

(1) *Plotinus, Enn. 6.3.14.22–6 (Henry-Schwyzzer²)*

In his third treatise, *On the kinds of being (Enn. 6.3)*, Plotinus gives an account of the structure of sensible substance in terms of his own theory of categories. When he comes to the category of quantity, he argues that there are three kinds of magnitudes – lines, planes and solids – and that each kind is qualitatively differentiated into lower kinds. Thus we have lines which are straight, circular or curved; planes which are triangular, quadrangular, and so on. Insofar as any of such items is a magnitude, it belongs to the category of quantity, but insofar as it exhibits a certain shape, Plotinus argues, it belongs to the category of quality. He then counters the suggestion that such items are essentially shapes, which would imply that they belong to the category of quality only:

Ἡ καθ’ αὐτὸ τοιάδε μορφή τὸ τρίγωνον. τί οὖν κωλύει καὶ τὴν σφαῖραν ποιὸν λέγειν; Εἰ οὖν τις ὁμόσε χωροῖ, τὴν γεωμετρίαν τοίνυν οὐ περὶ μεγέθη, ἀλλὰ περὶ ποιότητα καταγίνεσθαι. Ἄλλ’ οὐ δοκεῖ τοῦτο, ἀλλ’ ἡ πραγματεία αὕτη περὶ μεγέθη.¹⁴

Or, rather, the triangle by itself is such and such a shape. What, then, prevents us from calling even the sphere a qualitative thing? If one accepts that, then geometry will not be concerned with magnitudes but with qualities. But that does not seem to be the case, rather this science is concerned with magnitudes.

The protasis with the phrase *ὁμόσε χωρεῖν* introduces an antecedent whose unpalatable consequent is that geometry is not concerned with magnitudes but with qualities. Now, the consequent does not follow if one combats or rejects the idea formulated in the preceding sentences but only if one *accepts* it – that is, if one buys the idea that plane figures and solids are essentially shapes and therefore

¹² From this point on we use ‘concessive’ in the sense of ‘involving concession’.

¹³ L.G. Westerink explains this, in his edition of Damascius’ *Lectures on the Philebus* (2nd edn, Amsterdam, 1982), 140, with reference to Plato’s usage of *ὁμόσε ἵνα* in *Resp.* 610C. Westerink refers to Syrianus, *In Met.* 93.10 (with *ὅς*), Proclus, *In Ti.* 1.444.16 (sc. *τῆ ἀπορίας*) and Damascius, *De princ.* 1.29, p. 90.4 (*τῷ ἀποροῦντι*) and *In Phil.* 130.3 (*τῷ λόγῳ*). To these passages we can also add Syrianus, *In Met.* 59.34 (without object). However, *pace* Westerink, it is more likely that the Neoplatonists’ use of the phrase *ὁμόσε χωρεῖν* was inspired by passages such as *Euthyd.* 294D and *Th.* 166A (see n. 10), where we find exactly that phrase, rather than by *Resp.* 610C, where we find *ὁμόσε ἵνα*.

¹⁴ The text is that of Henry and Schwyzzer’s editio minor (Oxford, 1983), followed also by Armstrong (Cambridge, MA, 1988). The translation is ours.

qualitative things. It is obvious that the phrase *ὁμόσε χωρεῖν* in this passage requires a concessive connotation. Ficino was well aware of that requirement when he translated the phrase with *eodem tenore procedere*, and he is followed by modern translators such as S. MacKenna ('to proceed on these lines'),¹⁵ R. Harder ('geht man in der gleichen Richtung weiter')¹⁶ or L. Brisson ('si l'on continuait dans cette voie').¹⁷ This is the only place in Plotinus where the phrase *ὁμόσε χωρεῖν*, or indeed the adverb *ὁμόσε*, occurs.

(2) *Philoponus*, In Arist. Phys. 50.13–17 (*Vitelli*)

Towards the end of *Physics* 1.2, Aristotle observes that some of his predecessors were impressed by the Eleatic argument that one cannot be many, naively assuming that the terms 'one' or 'being' have only one sense. Although the last four lines of the chapter (185b34–186a3) are not entirely clear, Aristotle seems to be saying that some of his predecessors admitted that one is many (presumably in the sense that one thing is potentially many parts into which it can be divided) but found this admission problematic – as if it were impossible for the same thing to be both one and many, even when the two are not contraries.¹⁸ The relevant part of Philoponus' commentary on this passage runs as follows:

οἱ μέντοι ἀρχαιότεροι, φησίν, ἐνταῦθα ἤδη ἠπόρουν, λέγω δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ συνεχοῦς, καὶ οἷον νικώμενοι ὑπὸ τῆς ἀπορίας ὁμόσε τῷ ἀτόπῳ ἐχώρουν, καὶ ὠμολόγουν τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι καὶ πολλά, ὡς ἂν, φησίν, οὐκ ἐνδεχόμενον τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ εἶναι καὶ πολλά εἶναι, μὴ μέντοι τὰ ἀντικείμενα.

But the earlier thinkers, he says, 'were perplexed at that point', I mean in the case of the continuous, and, as if defeated by the perplexity, accepted the absurdity and 'agreed' that the same thing can be one and many, as if, he says, 'it were not possible for the same to be both one and many', provided they are not contraries.¹⁹

Philoponus glosses Aristotle's *ἠπόρουν* at 186a1 with *οἷον νικώμενοι ὑπὸ τῆς ἀπορίας ὁμόσε τῷ ἀτόπῳ ἐχώρουν*. This requires the expression *ὁμόσε χωρεῖν τῷ ἀτόπῳ* to have a meaning that tallies with *νικᾶσθαι ὑπὸ τῆς ἀπορίας*. Surely, if Aristotle's predecessors were defeated by a perplexity, they no longer fought or grappled with the absurdity but rather reconciled themselves with it. Moreover, the expression *ὁμόσε χωρεῖν τῷ ἀτόπῳ* must have a meaning that makes the conjunction with the next clause intelligible. In that next clause Aristotle's predecessors are said to have admitted that the same thing can be both one and many. Assuming that it is this admitted proposition that Aristotle's predecessors found perplexing

¹⁵ Plotinus, *The Enneads*, trans. S. MacKenna, rev. B.S. Page (2nd edn, London, 1957), 504. Note that *Enneads* 6.1–3 were translated by Page, not MacKenna: see 'Preface to the second edition', xv.

¹⁶ Plotin, *Schriften*, vol. 4a, trans. R. Harder, new revised edition with Greek text and commentary by R. Beutler and W. Theiler (Hamburg, 1967), 267.

¹⁷ Plotin, *Traité 42–44: sur les genres de l'être I, II et III*, trans. L. Brisson (Paris, 2008), 217.

¹⁸ So W.D. Ross in his commentary on these lines: *Aristotle's Physics* (Oxford, 1936), 470.

¹⁹ Presumably, *οἱ ἀρχαιότεροι* is not a group of thinkers older than *οἱ ὕστεροι τῶν ἀρχαίων* (185b26; cf. Philop. In Arist. Phys. 49.13) but rather the same group of thinkers differently designated, perhaps because Philoponus thought of them as being older than Aristotle. Osborne translates simply as 'the ancients'.

and absurd – given their conviction that nothing can be both one and many – we have to assume that the expression *ὁμόσε χωρεῖν* has concessive force: Aristotle’s predecessors succumbed to the perplexity and *accepted* the absurdity in acceding the proposition they found perplexing and absurd, namely that the same thing can be both one and many.

C. Osborne translates the clause containing the expression *ὁμόσε χωρεῖν* ‘as if overpowered by the difficulty, [the ancients] rushed into the arms of absurdity’,²⁰ which may not feature an entirely correct rendering of the expression but does show good judgement in avoiding the adversative force that is commonly associated with *ὁμόσε χωρεῖν*.

(3) *Philoponus*, In Arist. Meteor. 49.34–6 (*Hayduck*)

In *Meteorologica* 1.3, 341a12–36, Aristotle claims that the sun generates heat in the air by its circular motion, not by being itself hot or fiery. Philoponus finds that claim objectionable on several grounds. One of his grounds is that, in our region, fire heats other things by virtue of its quality of hotness, not by virtue of its motion, and hence it is reasonable to suppose that the same is the case with the sun – especially since Aristotle himself says (341a25) that we should take the phenomena in our region as evidence for what happens in the superlunary region. In supposing that celestial bodies are without qualities or affections (*ἀπαθῆ*), Philoponus adds, Aristotle intended ‘to oppose the phenomena and perception itself’ (*τοῖς φαινομένοις καὶ αὐτῇ πολεμεῖν τῇ αἰσθήσει*) only in order to save his theory. Philoponus clinches his argument by introducing the opinion of Alexander of Aphrodisias, Aristotle’s most influential exponent:

τούτου γοῦν καὶ ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος συναισθόμενος ὁμόσε ἐχώρει τῷ πράγματι καὶ τοῖς φαινομένοις, καὶ οὐκ ἀπαθῆ τὰ σώματα τῶν οὐρανίων ὁμολογεῖ, καὶ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη τούτου βούλεσθαι φησι, ταῦτα γράφων ἐπὶ λέξεως.

At any rate, even Alexander, being aware of that, accepted the fact and the phenomena, and agrees that bodies of the celestial entities are not unaffected, and claims this to be Aristotle’s view, when he [i.e. Alexander] writes, word for word, the following.

Having seen the problem, Alexander agreed that celestial bodies are not unaffected and, moreover, tried to show that Aristotle was really of the same mind. Philoponus illustrates this by appending a lengthy quotation from Alexander’s commentary on the *Meteorologica* (18.29–19.13) that follows the quoted passage. In any case, the expression *ὁμόσε χωρεῖν τῷ πράγματι καὶ τοῖς φαινομένοις* in this passage must have concessive force. To suppose that Alexander grappled with or rejected the fact and the phenomena would render the whole sentence a non sequitur. Moreover, the expression stands in contrast to ‘to oppose the phenomena and perception itself’ from lines 33–4, so it must mean essentially ‘to accept the fact and the phenomena’.

Note, however, that *ὁμόσε* in this passage is Hayduck’s correction of the MSS. reading *ὁμως*. This correction seems judicious, not only because the sentence with *ὁμως* does not make much sense but also because the correction is palaeographic-ally plausible. Perhaps *ὁμως* is a corruption of *ὁμόσε* due to an editor or scribe

²⁰ Philoponus, *On Aristotle Physics 1.1–3*, trans. C. Osborne (London, 2006), 70.

who was aware of the requirements of the context, but whose conviction that the phrase *ὁμόσε χωρεῖν* must have the adversative force led him to alter the text.²¹

There is only one further occurrence of the phrase *ὁμόσε χωρεῖν* in Philoponus' surviving works, namely in *De aeternitate mundi* 16.1, p. 565.14 (Rabe), but here it seems to be quite neutral. In 564.23–568.5 Philoponus takes issue with Proclus' argument according to which the eternity of the world follows from the premises that God wills the disordered state not to exist and that God wills the ordered state to exist. Philoponus proposes to examine the argument (*ἐγγυμνάσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ*, 565.9) by granting the premises and considering what follows from them. If the premises do not necessarily yield the conclusion that the world is eternal, Philoponus can rest his case against Proclus' argument. Philoponus starts his refutation by granting the first premise (565.14–16):

ὁμόσε δὲ τῷ λόγῳ χωρήσαντες ὁμολογοῦμεν αἰεὶ βούλεσθαι τὸν θεὸν μὴ εἶναι τὸ πλημμελῶς καὶ ἀτάκτως κινούμενον.

What he is saying here is that, having decided to deal with the argument, he grants that God always wills that what changes in a discordant and disorderly way does not exist. So we take it that with the phrase *ὁμόσε χωρεῖν* in the aorist Philoponus expresses his commitment, announced in the preceding sentences, to come to grips with Proclus' argument, recognizing that its refutation will require considerable effort. If we are right about this, the phrase *ὁμόσε χωρεῖν* is not used to express or indicate agreement, as Wilberding's translation suggests: 'In the interest of agreement, we concede to the argument that God *always* wills that what moves in a discordant and disorderly manner does not exist.'²² We suspect that Wilberding's rendering is the result of interpreting the phrase *ὁμόσε χωρεῖν* with an eye on the verb *ὁμολογεῖν*.

It is crucial to note, however, that the fact that the phrase *ὁμόσε χωρεῖν* does not have concessive force does not necessarily imply that it has adversative force. It can also be *neutral*. For instance, we can think of a person who decides to deal with a difficult problem as 'coming to grips with the problem', without any implication as to whether and how the person handles the problem; or, if one deals with a difficult argument, whether one is intent on rejecting it or accepting it. We would argue that this is how the phrase is used by Philoponus in the quoted passage from *De aeternitate mundi* or by Proclus when he says in his commentary on Plato's *Timaeus* (1.444.16): 'we need to come to grips with this difficulty and pursue it also in another way' (*ἔτι καὶ κατ' ἄλλον τρόπον μετιέναι χρὴ τὴν ἀπορίαν ὁμόσε χωροῦντας*).²³ It becomes clear from the context that Proclus is talking here about solving a difficulty, not about opposing it or agreeing with it.

²¹ Such a conviction is shared by some modern scholars. For instance, in his note on the text of Plutarch's *De facie in orbe lunae* 930C (*CPh* 46.3 [1951], p. 143), H. Cherniss wrote categorically: 'The phrase *ὁμόσε χωροῦντες* cannot mean anything but "taking issue with", "closing with".' We do not wish to dispute Cherniss's interpretation of the meaning of the phrase in Plutarch but to question the validity of the general claim with which he defends it.

²² Philoponus, *Against Proclus on the Eternity of the World* 12–18, trans. J. Wilberding (London, 2006), 69.

²³ Cf. the recent translation of the phrase by D.T. Runia and M. Share ('coming to grips') in Proclus, *Commentary on Plato's Timaeus, Volume II, Book 2: Proclus on the Causes of the Cosmos and its Creation* (Cambridge, 2008).

We have seen that some later authors occasionally use the phrase *ὀμόσε χωρεῖν* in the metaphorical meaning without any adversative connotation, i.e. neutrally or even with a concessive connotation. There is nothing in the etymology of the phrase to prevent such a development, and it is conceivable that the later authors came to use the phrase *ὀμόσε χωρεῖν* in non-standard ways under the influence of the etymologically cognate verb *συγχωρεῖν*. This verb can mean ‘to meet an argument’, ‘to bandy words with one’ (cf. LSJ s.v. *συγχωρεῖν* I, with the example of Euripides, *Hipp.* 703) as well as ‘to assent, agree with’ or ‘to concede or grant in argument, grant that’.²⁴ The same may be the case with the phrase *ὀμόσε πορεύεσθαι* (see n. 4). What this phrase means in Demosthenes’ speech *Against Dionysodorus* has been a subject of controversy, but it probably means something like ‘to be moving towards agreement’, as LSJ proposes.²⁵ We found only one other occurrence of it, in Clement of Alexandria (*Strom.* 7.11.66), where it means ‘to go against’, in perfect synonymy with *ὀμόσε χωρεῖν*. So, if *ὀμόσε πορεύεσθαι* in Demosthenes indeed has a concessive connotation, as LSJ suggests, and an adversative connotation in Clement, we have another case of the phrase *ὀμόσε* plus a verb of movement being used with two opposite meanings or connotations.

Of course, the phenomenon of enantiosemia – the same phrase having two opposite meanings or connotations – as with the phrases *ὀμόσε χωρεῖν* and *συγχωρεῖν*, is not uncommon. It is observable, for example, in the Latin verb *concurrere*, which can mean ‘to run together, charge’ or ‘to engage in battle, fight’ (see *OLD* s.v. *concurro* 3) as well as ‘to be in agreement, harmonize, fit in together’ (*OLD* s.v. *concurro* 6). In modern English the verb ‘concur’ is used with the latter meaning of the cognate Latin verb, but it used to have the former meaning too (see *OED* s.v. *concur* 1.b. ‘to run together in hostility, to rush at each other’, with examples from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries). It goes without saying that the meaning of these otherwise ambiguous expressions is determined by their context.

Having established that the phrase *ὀμόσε χωρεῖν* can have a concessive connotation, and that it has been used in this way by Plotinus and Philoponus, we are now in a position to solve the problem with the passage from Simplicius’ *Corollary* from which our article took its start. Despite the lack of support in LSJ and other dictionaries, we are justified in translating the passage 601.26–8 as follows:

First of all, one should pay attention to two theses that Aristotle accepted, to wit that the heaven does not change its place and that neither it nor the universe is in a place.

This is the only occurrence of the phrase *ὀμόσε χωρεῖν* in Simplicius, and one of the only two occurrences that we were able to detect in which the phrase is used in the perfect tense.²⁶ We would suggest that Simplicius chose the perfect to indicate that Aristotle’s acceptance of the two points is a result of his grappling with the problem of place, but also to intensify the meaning of the phrase, thus

²⁴ LSJ s.v. *συγχωρεῖν* I, with the example of Antiphon 5.27, and *συγχωρεῖν* II.2–4, with many examples.

²⁵ See F.A. Paley and J.E. Sandys (edd.), *Select Private Orations of Demosthenes* (3rd edn, Cambridge, 1898), 1.263–4, note ad loc.; and V. Bers (ed.), *Demosthenes, Speeches 50–59* (Austin, TX, 2003), 98, n. 17.

²⁶ The other occurrence is found in Philostratus the Elder, *Imag.* 2.13, p. 86.3 (Benndorf and Schenkl), where the phrase is used in the literal sense: *ὀμόσε κεχώρηκε τοῖς κύμασι*, ‘he struggles with the waves’ (trans. A. Fairbanks [London, 1931]). Other occurrences of the phrase in the perfect tense are confined to Byzantine authors.

expressing the idea that Aristotle did not merely accept those two points but rather that he was strongly committed to them.²⁷ Thus we get the following rendering of the passage:

First of all, one should pay attention to two theses that Aristotle *endorsed*, to wit that the heaven does not change its place and that neither it nor the universe is in a place.

The upshot of this article is that the treatment of the phrase *δμόσε χωρεῖν* in LSJ can be supplemented as far as later (Neoplatonic) authors are concerned. We have seen that the translation ‘to come to issue’ for the metaphorical meaning of the phrase is ambiguous and needs to be qualified according to the context. While the expression usually betrays an adversative connotation – to counter or refute an argument – later (Neoplatonic) authors also used it in a more neutral sense (‘to come to grips with an argument’). More to the point, the phrase can also have a concessive connotation, implying a concession or acceptance. It is precisely this latter connotation that we find in Simplicius’ *Corollary on Place* 601.26–8.

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²⁷ For the ‘intensive’ perfect, see Smyth’s *Greek Grammar* §1947 and Kühner-Gerth, *Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache* (Hannover and Leipzig, 1898), 1.148–9.