Resisting the Restriction of the Propositional Attitude Class

Dožudić, Dušan (2015) Resisting the Restriction of the Propositional Attitude Class. Croatian Journal of Philosophy, 15 (1). pp. 17-39. ISSN 1333-1108 (Print) ISSN 1847-6139 (Online)

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It is a standard view among philosophers that an attitude is propositional if a that clause could represent its content. One way of challenging this view is to argue that attitudes whose content can be represented in that way have categorically different content. A number of authors adopted such a strategy and imposed various restrictions on the propositional attitude class. In this paper, I will argue that such restrictions are not tenable because the arguments that are used to support them turn against such restrictions as well. As a consequence, if one cannot adequately deal with these arguments from the perspective of the standard view, one is forced to discard generally the propositionality of attitudes, perhaps even their relational nature. I will consider a strategy for resolving this challenge in favour of the standard view.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Depositing User: Maja Šoštarić
Date Deposited: 10 Nov 2017 13:28
Last Modified: 10 Nov 2017 13:28

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