The Amoralist Objection and the Method of Moral Reasoning

Sušnik, Matej (2009) The Amoralist Objection and the Method of Moral Reasoning. Croatian Journal of Philosophy, IX (25). pp. 91-100. ISSN 1333-1108 (Print) ISSN 1847-6139 (Online)

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n his book Moralna spoznaja Baccarini argues that, with respect to the individual reasoning about morality, the method of reflective equilibrium is the appropriate method of moral reasoning. The starting point of my argument is Baccarini’ s refutation of Hare’ s view. As I see it, one of Baccarini’ s central arguments against Hare consists in claiming that Hare’ s approach to the amoralist objection weakens the deductive model of moral reasoning. I argue that the amoralist objection also poses a threat to the method of reflective equilibrium. At the end of the paper, I consider another view of moral reasoning which, in my view, is better suited to deal with the amoralist objection.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Depositing User: Maja Šoštarić
Date Deposited: 17 Jan 2018 11:13
Last Modified: 17 Jan 2018 11:13

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