Sušnik, Matej (2015) Strong Motivational Internalism. International philosophical quarterly, 55 (2). pp. 165-177. ISSN 0019-0365
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Abstract
Strong motivational internalists claim that the relation between moral judgment and motivation is necessary. It is widely accepted that strong motivational internalism is false because it cannot accommodate various phenomena from common experience. In order to make room for these phenomena, motivational internalists usually propose the weak formulation of their thesis. In the first part of the paper I differentiate between several versions of both strong and weak motivational internalism. In the second part I argue that the reasons for endorsing weak motivational internalism of any form are not compelling.
Item Type: | Article |
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Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) |
Depositing User: | Maja Šoštarić |
Date Deposited: | 17 Jan 2018 11:27 |
Last Modified: | 14 Jan 2021 18:47 |
URI: | http://eprints.ifzg.hr/id/eprint/723 |
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