How to Eliminate Computational Eliminativism

Pećnjak, Davor (2005) How to Eliminate Computational Eliminativism. Croatian Journal of Philosophy, 5 (15). pp. 433-439. ISSN 1333-1108

How to Eliminate Computational Eliminativism (2).pdf

Download (107kB) | Preview


Concerning the question about consciousness, Georges Rey argues that it does not exist from the success of computational theory of human mind. Everything that such a theory requires can be fulfilled by machines which do not have consciousness. So, according to theoretical parsimony, we do not have to attribute consciousness even to human beings. I wish to offer reasons why we should not doubt the existence of consciousness by showing that computational explanations can be explanations of just one part of an aspect of the human mind. Consciousness is also an explanandum rather than an explanans, and the possible reference of “ what it is like” expression. Epistemic situation regarding possible accesses to consciousness is also considered.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Depositing User: Institut za filozofiju
Date Deposited: 29 Jan 2018 13:28
Last Modified: 29 Jan 2018 13:28

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item