Pećnjak, Davor (2018) Free Deliberation. In: Filip Grgić & Davor Pećnjak (eds.), Free Will and Action: Historical nad Contemporary Perspectives. Springer, Cham, pp. 39-46. ISBN ISBN 978-3-319-99294-5 ISBN 978-3-319-99295-2 (eBook)
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Abstract
In this paper, the author takes a theistic stance in defense of libertarian free will. He argues, first, that if determinism is true, then there is no deliberation. Every step in our mental processes of which deliberation supposedly consists is in this case already determined by some initial state of the universe and laws that deterministically govern the universe, and even a decision (and action that stems from it) is uniquely determined and could not be otherwise. An agent in a deterministic world would not be a real agent, but just a passive observer of what happens to him with only an illusion that he has control over himself. But this is unacceptable. In the second part, the author assumes that God, as a morally perfect being, is not a deceiver, and combines this with a notion, taken from Carl Ginet, of “actish phenomenal feeling” that accompanies our mental acts. If we often, if not always, have such a feeling that tells us that we are in control of our thinking and deciding, and if God created human beings who have it, then we really have libertarian freedom of deliberation, will and action.
| Item Type: | Book Section |
|---|---|
| Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) |
| Depositing User: | Institut za filozofiju |
| Date Deposited: | 09 Oct 2019 12:54 |
| Last Modified: | 14 Jan 2021 18:48 |
| URI: | http://eprints.ifzg.hr/id/eprint/863 |
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