Free will, Causation and Sartorio's Causation and Free Will

Anić, Zvonimir and Pećnjak, Davor (2020) Free will, Causation and Sartorio's Causation and Free Will. Prolegomena, 19 (1). pp. 77-90. ISSN 1333-4395 (Tisak) 1846-0593 (Online)

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No matter what side one takes in the debate about free will, one will also have to accept certain metaphysical assumptions about causation and causal laws and, consequently, posit a certain ontological framework. In Causation and Free Will, Sartorio develops a compatibilist, actual causal sequence account of free will which is grounded on certain controversial features that causation presumably has. In this paper, we argue that those features cannot be jointly incorporated adequately into any plausible philosophical account of causation regardless of the validity of the thesis of causal determinism, and that they work against one another in Sartorio’s account of free will. We argue that no philosophical account of free will can establish the freedom of the will without offering a plausible answer of how an agent can have a grip on causation.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Depositing User: Institut za filozofiju
Date Deposited: 17 Jun 2020 13:33
Last Modified: 17 Jun 2020 13:33

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