Škarica, Dario (2020) Istina u Akvinca, Merciera i Zimmermanna. Služba Božja, 60 (1). pp. 5-28. ISSN 0037-7074
![[img]](http://eprints.ifzg.hr/style/images/fileicons/text.png) |
Text
Sluzba Bozja_ Istina u Akvinca Merciera i Zimmermanna_2020.pdf Download (216kB) |
Abstract
Sažetak Glavna je tema rada Tomin pojam istine, posebno njegova distinkcija između istine uma (veritas intellectus) i istine stvari (veritas rerum). Pritom je veritas intellectus (logička istina) istražena u punom njenu značenju, tj. ne samo kao podudaranje sudova s njihovim objektima nego i kao svrha kojoj sudovi prirodno teže, kao i unutar njezine vlastite svrhe (znanja). Unutar ove rasprave izložene su i neke misli o naravi suda, znatno prožete Tominom distinkcijom između praktičnog i spekulativnog znanja. Nadalje, pokazano je da Tomin termin veritas rerum obuhvaća dva veoma različita pojma istine: prvo, pojam objektivne istine, koji se tiče stvari kao objekata naših sudova i normi njihove istinitosti, i drugo, pojam ontološke istine, koji se tiče stvari u mjeri u kojoj one refl ektiraju Božje ideje kao svoje egzemplarne uzroke i norme svoje stvarnosti. Konačno, utvrđeno je da Mercier i Zimmermann sekulariziraju Tomin pojam istine, ali sekularizacijom bitno provizornog karaktera. Summary The main topic of this paper is Thomas Aquinas‘s concept of truth, particularly his distinction between the truth of intellect (veritas intellectus) and the truth of things (veritas rerum). Here, veritas intellectus (logical truth) is considered in its full sense, i. e., not only as mere correspondence of judgements to their objects, but also as the natural aim of judgements and within its own natural aim, which is knowledge. Within this discussion, some thoughts are presented concerning the nature of 28 Dario Škarica, Istina u Akvinca, Merciera i Zimmermanna judgement, which are considerably permeated with Thomas‘s distinction between practical and speculative knowledge. Next, Thomas‘s term veritas rerum is proven to encompass two rather different notions of truth, the fi rst being the notion of objective truth, referring to things as objects of our judgements and norms of their truth, and the second being the notion of ontological truth, referring to things insofar as they refl ect divine ideas as their exemplar causes and norms of their reality. Finally, Mercier‘s and Zimmermann‘s secularization of Thomas‘s concept of truth is identifi ed and shown to be essentially provisional in character.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Ključne riječi: Toma Akvinski, Désiré-Joseph Mercier, Stjepan Zimmermann, logička istina, objektivna istina, ontološka istina, sud. Keywords: Thomas Aquinas, Désiré-Joseph Mercier, Stjepan Zimmermann, logical truth, objective truth, ontological truth, judgement. |
| Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) |
| Depositing User: | Institut za filozofiju |
| Date Deposited: | 17 Nov 2020 12:19 |
| Last Modified: | 17 Nov 2020 12:19 |
| URI: | http://eprints.ifzg.hr/id/eprint/914 |
Actions (login required)
 |
View Item |
