Gregorić, Pavel and Pfeiffer, Christian (2015) Grasping Aristotle's Intellect. Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale, 26. pp. 13-31. ISSN 1122-5750
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Abstract
In this paper we offer a novel interpretation of the second aporia stated in Aristotle’s De Anima III.4, the question whether the intellect can think itself. We propose that the aporia does not aim at reflexive awareness of one’s own thoughts, as is commonly assumed, but relies on a more objectivist account of the intellect. The question, we claim, is whether the intellect can itself become an object of intellectual grasp. On our interpretation of III.4, Aristotle argues that the intellect is itself thinkable insofar as it thinks its objects, which means that grasping the intellect is a matter of grasping the objects that it thinks. We show that, on this account, there is no difference in the way one grasps one’s own intellect and the way one grasps another person’s intellect.
| Item Type: | Article |
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| Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) |
| Depositing User: | Maja Šoštarić |
| Date Deposited: | 09 Nov 2017 11:13 |
| Last Modified: | 09 Nov 2017 11:13 |
| URI: | http://eprints.ifzg.hr/id/eprint/552 |
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